How Seznam keeps one sign-in across many domains with passkeys and Related Origin Requests

Jan Dušek
Jan Dušek Web Developer
Ondřej Žára
Ondřej Žára Team Lead
Yu Tsuno
Yu Tsuno

Published: November 16, 2026

Seznam is a Czech technology company and identity provider whose services reach about 90% of the Czech population. One Seznam account works across services on seznam.cz, its subdomains, and standalone domains such as mapy.com, sport.cz, and stream.cz. Browsers keep these sites apart. To make one account still feel like one product, Seznam built its sign-in around first-party redirects, Federated Credential Management (FedCM), and WebAuthn Related Origin Requests. The result is an 84.5% adjusted sign-in completion rate after domain consolidation (rising from 53% to 69% in browsers outside Chromium), and a passkey created on one Seznam domain works on the others. Developers and identity architects operating multiple domains can apply these same patterns to unify sign-in without relying on third-party cookies.

The challenge: One account, many sites

Picture someone who signs in on seznam.cz in the morning, opens mapy.com to plan a weekend trip, and checks a match result on sport.cz at lunch. For that person, it's all Seznam. For the browser, these are three unrelated sites, and each one keeps its own cookies, saved passwords, and passkeys.

Seznam already handled authentication in one place. Services send users to login.seznam.cz, where the login team maintains Google Sign-In, Bank iD, passkeys, and other methods, so individual services don't have to. That centralization fixed the maintenance problem. Three others remained:

  • Sessions stop at the site boundary. Signing in at login.seznam.cz doesn't sign anyone in to sport.cz. Background requests that could share the session depend on third-party cookies, and those work only when the browser and the user's privacy settings allow them.
  • The login page has two addresses. For historical reasons, the same login form runs on login.seznam.cz and on the legacy login.szn.cz. Both share a backend, but the browser sees two sites, so a password or passkey saved on one isn't offered on the other.
  • Each passkey belongs to a single site. A passkey is bound to its relying party ID (RP ID). Users manage passkeys at ucet.seznam.cz and at account.mapy.com. By default, a passkey created on mapy.com doesn't work on a Seznam login page.

This fragmentation was impractical at best, and Seznam discovered two concrete problems with the split-domain approach:

  • Some browsers cleared cookies on the legacy login.szn.cz domain because users visited it infrequently.
  • Propagating session-related secrets across origins required several complex redirects.

Seznam wanted to carry the signed-in state to every service through first-party contexts, so it would keep working under any browser privacy setting and users wouldn't have to sign in again.

The solution: Sign in once, then carry the session

Seznam kept one place to authenticate and focused on moving the result to wherever the user goes next. Each technique in this section handles one part of the problem, and each one relies on a first-party context.

Hand off the session with first-party redirects

After a user signs in, the login service creates a short-lived secret, called a ticket, backed by server-side storage. A top-level redirect carries the ticket to the target domain, where the backend exchanges it for a local session cookie. Each hop is an ordinary navigation, so the backend sets every cookie in a first-party context. Most users never notice it happening.

One DNS detail makes this handoff work across unrelated domains. For each service domain, such as sport.cz, Seznam creates a login.sport.cz record that points to the central login backend. A request to login.sport.cz/ticket/TICKET reaches the login backend, but it's served from a sport.cz host, so the backend can set a session cookie for all of sport.cz.

You can watch the chain in the Chrome DevTools Network panel. Turn on Preserve log, sign in, and filter for ticket.

Chrome DevTools Network panel listing three 302 redirects from login.seznam.cz to login.sport.cz.
Network panel showing the redirect chain after sign-in.

The following abbreviated requests and responses show each hop for a user who signs in and continues to sport.cz. The first two hops sign the user in on both login domains. The last one signs them in to the service.

GET https://login.seznam.cz/continue

HTTP/1.1 302 FOUND
Location: https://login.szn.cz/ticket/TICKET
Set-Cookie: session=SESSION_ID; Domain=seznam.cz; Secure; HttpOnly

GET https://login.szn.cz/ticket/TICKET

HTTP/1.1 302 FOUND
Location: https://login.sport.cz/ticket/TICKET
Set-Cookie: session=SESSION_ID; Domain=szn.cz; Secure; HttpOnly

GET https://login.sport.cz/ticket/TICKET

HTTP/1.1 302 FOUND
Location: https://login.sport.cz/loginDone
Set-Cookie: session=SESSION_ID; Domain=sport.cz; Secure; HttpOnly

Replace the following:

  • TICKET: the short-lived secret created by the login service.
  • SESSION_ID: the local session cookie value.

Try the quiet options before asking the user

When someone arrives at a Seznam service without a local session, the service can redirect the browser to the central login. If a valid central session exists, the login service runs the same ticket handoff and sends the user back signed in. If not, the browser comes back signed out. This redirect is a top-level navigation, so it works whatever the browser's third-party cookie settings are.

Services also embed a JavaScript library from the login team. The library provides a consistent account interface, and when no session exists yet, it works through a fallback list from least to most visible:

  1. The library queries the service's own login subdomain to check whether a session exists.
  2. If no local session exists, the library sends a credentialed cross-origin request to login.seznam.cz.
  3. If that request fails, the library falls back to FedCM.
  4. If no automatic option succeeds, the Sign in with Seznam button opens the central login in a pop-up or redirects the page.

On sport.cz, the first check looks like this:

const badgeResponse = await fetch("https://login.sport.cz/badge", {
  credentials: "include",
});

If that request finds no session, the library tries the central login domain:

const autologinResponse = await fetch("https://login.seznam.cz/autologin", {
  method: "POST",
  credentials: "include",
  headers: { accept: "application/json" },
});

The second request works only when the browser permits third-party cookies and the endpoint is configured for credentialed Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS). When that request fails, FedCM takes over. The FedCM and Seznam case study describes how Seznam uses FedCM with external partners. The same approach also covers Seznam's own services.

Demonstration of signing in on seznam.cz and using the same account and passkey across Seznam domains including mapy.com.
Signing in on seznam.cz and reusing the session and passkey across Seznam domains.

Users create and manage passkeys in their Seznam account, which runs at ucet.seznam.cz and at account.mapy.com. Seznam set one rule: every passkey uses seznam.cz as its RP ID, no matter which account origin creates it. A passkey created on either origin then works on login.seznam.cz.

For ucet.seznam.cz, that setup is standard WebAuthn, because a subdomain can use its parent domain as the RP ID. account.mapy.com is a different site, so the browser normally rejects seznam.cz as its RP ID. Related Origin Requests remove that block. Seznam publishes a /.well-known/webauthn file on seznam.cz that lists the origins allowed to use its RP ID:

{
  "origins": [
    "https://account.mapy.com",
    "https://login.szn.cz"
  ]
}

When account.mapy.com calls WebAuthn with the following relying party configuration, the browser fetches the file, finds the origin on the list, and continues:

{
  "rp": {
    "id": "seznam.cz",
    "name": "Seznam.cz"
  }
}
Chrome Google Password Manager dialog prompting to create a passkey to sign in to seznam.cz for elisa.beckett@seznam.cz.
Creating a passkey on a related origin for the seznam.cz relying party ID.

Chrome processes at most five effective top-level domain plus one (eTLD+1) labels from this file and ignores the rest. For a company with as many domains as Seznam, that five-label limit sounded like a problem, but it wasn't. Only the origins that create or manage passkeys need to be on the list. Other services sign users in through the central login.

Because Related Origin Requests weren't available in every browser when Seznam built this sign-in flow, the login page also uses WebAuthn within a cross-origin iframe.

On the sign-in page, the iframe is the small key button next to Continue. Users see a button. They don't see that it's loaded from a different origin.

Seznam.cz sign-in form showing the email or phone field, the red Continue button, and a small square red key icon button beside it.
The cross-origin iframe key button next to Continue on the sign-in page.
<iframe
  allow="publickey-credentials-get *"
  title="Verification using a security key"
  src="https://login.seznam.cz/fido.html"
></iframe>

The iframe loads a minimal document from login.seznam.cz that contains a <button> element and a short script. Because the document runs on login.seznam.cz, it can use seznam.cz as the RP ID without Related Origin Requests, even when it's embedded in login.szn.cz. The flow has three steps:

  1. The parent page sends the request options to the iframe with postMessage().
  2. The user clicks the key button, and the iframe calls navigator.credentials.get().
  3. The iframe returns the credential or the error to the parent page with postMessage().

Both sides check the sender's origin on every message. The iframe document also restricts which pages can embed it:

Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors https://login.seznam.cz https://login.szn.cz

Passkeys were only half of the fragmentation problem. To make saved passwords appear on both login domains, every participating domain publishes the same /.well-known/assetlinks.json file with the delegate_permission/common.get_login_creds relationship. Password managers that support Digital Asset Links recognize these domains as affiliated and offer the same saved passwords on each.

Impact: Higher sign-in completion and one passkey across domains

The numbers tell part of the story. The rest shows up in how the setup works for users, service teams, and the login team:

  • Users sign in once and are usually already signed in when they open the next Seznam service. A passkey they created while managing their account on mapy.com works on the Seznam login page.
  • Service teams add the login library and get Google Sign-In, Bank iD, passkeys, and FedCM without building or maintaining any of them.
  • The login team ships sign-in changes once, in one place. The main session paths don't depend on third-party cookies, so they behave the same when a browser or a user blocks third-party cookies.

Related Origin Requests didn't have to move a headline conversion number to earn their place. In the weeks after passkeys shipped, sign-in success on Chromium held at 87.1% and didn't recede. Across the full login population, the completion rate sat at 82.0%, slightly above the 81.4% June baseline. After the login domain consolidated onto login.seznam.cz, the adjusted completion rate reached 84.5% by September. In browsers outside Chromium, the share of identifiable users who completed sign-in rose from 53% to 69% as more of the journey became first-party and visible.

The lasting gain, though, is architectural. Users can create a passkey on the domain where they manage their account and use it on the domain where they sign in. As a result, Seznam doesn't have to trade a working login for stronger authentication, or a stronger authenticator for a fragmented experience. One RP ID keeps the product continuous across services, without asking anyone to register a new credential every time they cross a site boundary.

Technical insights for teams

While building this system, Seznam learned lessons that apply to any company that runs more than one domain.

  • Build on top-level navigation: Use first-party redirects as your baseline session handoff, and layer credentialed fetch() requests and FedCM on top as progressive optimizations.
  • Give every service domain a login subdomain: Point a login.SERVICE_DOMAIN DNS record to the central authentication backend so one server can set first-party cookies for any domain.
  • Choose one RP ID before users create passkeys: Bind every passkey to a single primary RP ID and list only the origins that create or verify passkeys in /.well-known/webauthn to stay under Chrome's five-label limit.
  • Plan for browsers without Related Origin Requests: Embed a cross-origin iframe with the publickey-credentials-get Permissions Policy token so browsers that throw a SecurityError exception on mismatched RP IDs can still use the same passkeys.
  • Treat the iframe as a security boundary: Check event.origin on every postMessage() call, restrict embedders with the Content Security Policy (CSP) frame-ancestors directive, and follow the passkeys within iframes guide to validate origin, crossOrigin, and topOrigin in clientDataJSON on the server.

What's next

With passkeys working across its domains, Seznam is exploring capabilities such as WebAuthn immediate mediation to make sign-in simpler while keeping authentication in first-party contexts.

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